We analyse the following question associated with flexible outsourcing under partly imperfect dual domestic labour markets, where skilled workers participate in a firm's profit: First, how does the implementation of profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing and low-skilled wage and thus how does it affect employment? Second, how do the outsourcing costs affect the low-skilled wage? We show that profit sharing has a positive effect on the low-skilled wage and thus an outsourcing enhancing character. Also higher outsourcing costs will increase the low-skilled wage, so that higher costs for external procurement and profit sharing will decrease the wage dispersion. On the other hand, the employment effect of profit sharing is ambiguous, since there is an employment reducing effect due to higher wage, which can be offset by the employment increasing effect of higher effort.
Introduction
In an integrated world, marginal cost differences are the driving force for the reallocation of production parts (offshoring) and for the make-or-buy decision (outsourcing). Especially for Western European countries, the wage and labour cost differences constitute the central explanation for the increasing business practice of offshoring and international outsourcing to Eastern European or Asian countries.
1 Reasons for the wage gap are, amongst others, differences in labour market institutions and the process of wage determination. In most Western European countries, wages are determined by bilateral bargaining between firms or employer federations and trade unions. In opposite, unions in Eastern European or Asian countries are much weaker or wages are determined by market forces. Typically low-skilled workers in Western Europe are unionized so that labour unions are able to push for their relatively high wages at the costs of a higher unemployment in continental Europe than in the United States (see e.g. Freeman and Schettkat, 2001 ).
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Since Western European firms have the opportunity to buy foreign intermediate goods after knowing the domestic wage levels and so the marginal production costs, this affects the domestic wage formation process for both types of workers. The threat of flexible outsourcing as a reaction to high domestic marginal production costs will dampen the opportunity of the trade union to realize a high wage level for low-skilled workers. To induce them to abstain from external procurement of intermediate goods, Western European firms need lower marginal costs. Since wages for skilled and unskilled workers affect the marginal production costs, there are two components to reduce marginal costs. If lower wages are not possible, firms must raise their productivity. One channel to increase productivity is to stimulate workers' effort. The firm may introduce a profit sharing scheme that lets workers participate in the firm's success. The implementation of profit sharing will induce incentives to increase effort and thus productivity for given wage levels. Empirical studies show that profit sharing is an important phenomenon in many OECD countries. 3 However, only high-skilled workers, such as managers, often realize profit sharing as part of their income. The conclusion of the political debate about this procedure is that the participation of manager on firm's profit set wrong incentives, where politicians argue that due to the dependence of the income on the profit, the manager purely pursuit the strategy of highest short-run profit, which is one reason for the increasing practice of domestic jobs relocation. But politics ignore other aspects of profit sharing. The idea behind a profit sharing scheme is to stimulate motivation and identification and thus effort and productivity of the workforce due to the participation on firm's success, which is 1 See Amiti and Wei (2005) and Rishi and Saxena (2004) , who emphasize the big difference in labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of manufacturing and services to countries with low labour costs.
There are some papers that analyse the effects of outsourcing when labour is heterogeneous, like Davidson et al. (2007 Davidson et al. ( , 2008 . However, these papers concentrate on labour market frictions that arise with search, while we focus on the role of labour unions in the case of unskilled wage formation.
positively influenced by their effort. Although, only high-skilled workers often realize profit sharing as a part of their income, profit sharing will also affect wage formation for high and low-skilled workers. An intuitively explanation for the influence on the high-skilled wage is the opportunity to substitute the wage income by profit income. Thus the high-skilled wage level can decrease with an implementation of a profit sharing scheme. Also the wage bargaining for low-skilled workers is affected. Since higher effort of skilled workers provides higher productivity and thus raises the firm's profit, this opens the opportunity for the labour union to pick up a higher share of this profit by demanding a higher wage for low-skilled workers. On the other hand, this will increase the marginal costs and thus profit sharing will dampen the advantage of domestic production and increases outsourcing activities. As profit sharing becomes more in focus of firms, unions and the political discussion, the implications of bonus payments if firms are only profit orientated has to be analysed from a theoretical point of view by analyzing the different effects and support or confute the public opinion at least on the firm level.
Concerning the analysis of the effects of outsourcing on compensation schemes under wage bargaining, there are two focuses in the literature: the case of committed and flexible outsourcing. While in the committed case, outsourcing takes place before wage bargaining 4 , in the flexible case outsourcing is decided after wage bargaining. Our focus in this chapter is to assume that outsourcing is flexible, i.e. determined simultaneously with domestic labour demand, but after wage formation for low-skilled workers. To our knowledge, the first, who study the effects of flexible outsourcing on wage setting, is Skaksen (2004) . He has analysed the implications of outsourcing, in terms of potential (non-realized) and realized international outsourcing, for wage setting and employment under imperfectly competitive homogeneous labour markets. By assuming that output is produced by combining two intermediate activities, where one activity can be perfectly substituted by outsourcing, he shows that the wage level depends positively on outsourcing costs. If these costs are under a lower bound, the union will desist from wage dumping to avoid outsourcing. When the costs are over a critical value, then there is no outsourcing and the union can set a relative high wage level. For cost levels between these limits, external procurement can be prevented by setting domestic wage level equal to outsourcing costs. Braun and Scheffel (2007b) have also developed a simple two-stage game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming that the labour union sets wage before the firm decides on the degree of outsourcing. In their model they argue that under such flexible outsourcing the costs of outsourcing have an ambiguous effect on the wage. But in these papers they have abstracted from the analysis of profit sharing as a part of the compensation scheme or heterogeneity of labour force, which is our focus. 5 Concerning the wage effect of profit sharing, Koskela and Stenbacka (2006) have 4 See e.g. Perry (1997) for an overview about the relationship between outsourcing and wage bargaining.
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For an introduction into the debate on dual labour markets, see Saint-Paul (1996) . However, this research is also in the absence of both, outsourcing and profit sharing. Koskela and Stenbacka (2009) analyse strategic outsourcing in a dual labour market in the presence of wage solidarity by the labour union. They find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between high-skilled and low-skilled workers while the labour union's solidaristic wage policy will dampen this tendency. Moreover, they find that outsourcing will reduce equilibrium unemployment if the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low. studied the differences between committed and flexible profit sharing, but both in the absence of outsourcing and heterogeneous labour market. By combining outsourcing and profit sharing in a dual labour market we provide answers to the following question: How does the implementation of profit sharing for high-skilled workers influence the low-skilled wage level and thus outsourcing activities and employment? By analyzing our main question, we also answer: How do the costs of outsourcing influence the wage for low-skilled workers?
We analyse these questions in a partial equilibrium model in which we assume a time sequence of the profit sharing decision, where firms commit to profit sharing before the base wage formation and decide flexible about the amount of outsourcing after knowing the domestic production costs. We find that the profit participation has an individual effort augmenting effect for high-skilled workers, which increases the labour demand. Due to the complementary relationship of labour types, this increases the low-skilled wage. Thus for a constant high-skilled wage, bonus payments lead to a lower wage dispersion in a firm, where a profit sharing scheme is implemented. However, the employment effect of profit sharing for both types of labour is ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a labour augmenting effect via higher effort, but on the other hand there is a labour reducing effect via the induced wage increase for low-skilled workers. Since in our framework, outsourcing and low-skilled labour are substitutes, the amount of outsourcing is only affected by the relation of low-skilled workers wage and outsourcing costs. Since profit sharing will increase the low-skilled wage, it has an indirect enhancing effect on outsourcing activities. Furthermore, we find that higher outsourcing costs lead to increasing wage for low-skilled workers. Since in our framework the high-skilled wage is constant and higher than the low-skilled wage, higher outsourcing costs will also lower the wage dispersion.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of theoretical framework and the time sequences in terms of profit sharing decision. Labour and outsourcing demand and employee effort are presented in section 3 whilst section 4 investigates the low-skilled wage formation by monopoly labour union with committed profit sharing and the employment effects. Finally, we present conclusions in section 5.
Basic Framework
We analyse in a model with heterogeneous domestic workers, i.e. a dual domestic labour market, flexible international outsourcing and committed profit sharing. The production combines effective skilled worker services and unskilled worker services. Effective skilled employment is a combination of absolute skilled employment and the effort by skilled workers, i.e. their productivity. Following empirical studies, we assume that low-skilled workers and outsourcing activities are substitutes, so that unskilled labour services can be provided either by the firm's own workers, or obtained from abroad through international outsourcing.
We assume that the firm may be flexible enough to decide upon the amount of external procurement after the wage for low-skilled workers is set by the labour union. Therefore, flexible outsourcing acts as a threat to high domestic marginal production costs. Furthermore, the timing structure captures the idea that the representative firm decides profit sharing before the monopoly trade union sets the unskilled wage. The analysed timing sequence of the decisions is summarized in Figure 1 . In this timing structure profit sharing is assumed to be committed at Stage 1 and at Stage 2 conditional on profit sharing, the labour union determines the wage for unskilled workers by taking into account how this affects the demand for labour and outsourcing by the firm. We assume that there are many industries, so that each labour union represents only a small fraction of the total labour force. At Stage 3, the representative firm decides on domestic employment and international outsourcing. The wage of the skilled labour is adjusted to the constant world market level and given for the firm. Moreover, the representative skilled worker decides on effort provision given this wage level and the profit share and so knows the earning components.
The decisions at each stage are analysed by using backward induction.
Labour Demand, Outsourcing Decision and Employee Effort

Labour Demand and Outsourcing
At the last stage, the representative skilled worker decides the effort i e and the representative firm decides the skilled labour demand H , the unskilled labour demand L , and outsourcing M . The firm decides domestic labour demand and outsourcing to maximize the profit function In order to obtain M units of outsourced unskilled labour input, we assume that firms have to
. This cost formulation reveals that there are some other costs associated with outsourcing such as the price the intermediate goods. Such costs could be costs for quality proofing or transport, which are exponential increasing with higher outsourcing. To allow for an exponential cost increase, we model a quadratic cost function. We assume a Cobb-Douglas-type production function with decreasing returns to scale
, where the parameters α and β are assumed to satisfy the assumptions 0 , > β α
. From the production function, we can derive the marginal products of skilled labour, unskilled labour and
. The outsourced unskilled labour input affects the marginal products of the domestic skilled and unskilled labour inputs as follows:
Taking these derivatives, we can conclude that for our type of production function the domestic skilled labour input and the outsourced unskilled labour input are complements, whereas the unskilled domestic labour input and the outsourced unskilled labour input are substitutes in terms of the marginal product effects of outsourcing. Also, one can calculate from the production function that domestic skilled and unskilled labours are complements, i.e.
. Using the marginal products we can calculate the first-order conditions characterizing the domestic skilled and unskilled labour demand and outsourcing activities as
A specification, which is also common in the literature, describes effort as the fraction of working hours that the worker actually works. Since the number of working hours is normalized to 1, the choice of an individual is ( ) 
The first-order conditions (2a) and (2b) imply the relationship between the skilled ( ) H and the unskilled labours, inclusive of outsourcing ( )
Using (2b) and (2c) we get the demand for outsourcing as
where
According to equation (4) higher unskilled domestic wage rate and lower outsourcing costs will increase outsourcing. Substituting (3) into the production function and coming with (2b) gives the unskilled labour demand, which can be expressed as follows , with δ as the own wage elasticity and ε as the cross wage elasticity in the absence of outsourcing. According to (5), a more extensive outsourcing activity will decrease the unskilled labour demand, which shows the substitutability of low-skilled labour and international outsourcing, which is consistent with empirical evidence. As we can see, higher own wage and cross wage and lower highskilled effort will negatively affect the unskilled labour demand. In the presence of outsourcing the direct own wage and cross wage elasticities of unskilled labour, 
where ( )
. These elasticities are higher with weaker decreasing returns to scale, but unlike in unskilled labour case, the own wage and cross wage labour demand elasticities and the effort elasticity for skilled labour are independent of outsourcing. Using the equations (4), (5) and (7) by plugging into the profit function (1) we can write after calculations the indirect profit function as
Effort Formation and Direct Employment Effects for Skilled Workers
Effort Determination of Skilled Workers
By following the literature of efficiency wage models, we assume that for the employed highskilled worker the utility function is additively separable in income and effort, where the utility depends positively on wage and profit income and negatively on the disutility of effort. Following this specification, the employed skilled worker receives an income of y , which includes the wage H w and the profit income H π τ ⋅ so that the overall remuneration can be written as
. The idea behind this is that high-skilled workers are assumed to be a team. The whole team gets the profit income π τ ⋅ , which is distributed equally among the members. However, to get the profit income, it causes effort provision of a worker. Since the worker dislikes effort provision, it is associated with a disutility, which can be described by ) (e g , where ( ) 
For being simple we assume a small firm so that the wage the firm pays is the market wage for a skilled worker, and therefore high-skilled workers get anywhere the same wage H w . A result of this assumption is that there will be no unemployment for skilled workers. However, the skilled jobs will be different with respect to their job characteristics due to the existence of a profit sharing system.
Notice, that every skilled worker in a firm, which implements a profit sharing system, gets the same per capita profit income. However, the worker realizes the individual disutility for providing a certain effort level. Thus, there is space for free-rider behaviour by the single worker, which means that there is an incentive for shirking. The biggest problem of a firm's owner is to solve this moral hazard problem and to verify the individual effort. 7 In the discussion of the free-rider problem, interactions of the group member and peer pressure are often neglected. Due to the implementation of profit sharing there are incentives in the group to internalize the externalities of free-riding and avoiding shirking, since it sets some incentives to observe each other and interact. 8 This can build up peer pressure to provide the individual effort resulting from individual utility maximization and eliminate the moral hazard problem concerning free-rider behaviour. Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) , we motivate this peer pressure as a group norm. Due to the observation, the individual feels shame or guilt if the individual effort is below this norm, i.e. if the individual shirks, since it lowers the income for each team member. Due to this shame, the individual realizes a loss of utility. However, an effort above the norm will also decrease the individual utility, since now the other team member will feel shame. Thus, any deviation from the norm will lead to a utility loss and can be interpreted as a punishment. Since any deviation from the group norm decreases the individual utility, we model the peer pressure function as a quadratic function, which can in simple form be written as
, where ẽ is the social norm and defined as the average effort of all other workers than i .
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Using these assumptions, we can formalize the utility function for an employed worker in a profit sharing firm in (9a) and (9b) in a firm, where is no profit sharing
where τ is profit sharing and π the representative firm's profit and H the employment or the team size of this firm. A worker's problem is to choose the level of individual effort to maximize its utility. For simplicity of analysis, suppose that the observation of a team member is costless and that the 7
In the literature of efficiency wage models this is solved with paying a higher wage than the competitive level, see Salop (1979) , Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and the book edited by Akerlof and Yellen (1986) , which includes as the standard efficiency wage models, i.e. shirking models, labour turnover models, adverse selection models and sociological models). See the analysis by FitzRoy and Kraft (1986) , Holmstrom (1982) , Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) and Varian (1990) . Radner (1986) shows, that in repeated games under certain conditions the free-rider problem can be eliminated even if the players cannot observe other players' actions or information, but can only observe the resulting consequences.
Within this framework, we assume that every group member can verify the effort of the others, but the firm owner cannot do this. It should also be emphasized, that the shirking or over motivated members are punished. However, this punishment is a utility loss and not an income loss, where the utility loss can be interpreted as mental harassment or social exclusion. 
Since we focus on individual effort determination, the effect on employment will be not taken into account. Therefore, Inserting the labour demand for low-skilled and high-skilled workers, equations (5) and (7), we find for the individual effect on profit Remember, that the group norm is defined as the observable average effort of all other team members. Assuming Nash-behaviour, where every worker takes the effort of the others as given, in the equilibrium, the individual chosen effort level equals the group norm, which corresponds to the average effort level of all other group members. Finally, we have e e= . Therefore, for identical workers, the individual effort also equals the average effort level and effort level which would be chosen without any peer pressure. Using this, we get from solving equation ( 
Therefore, the optimal effort by the representative skilled worker is influenced by the income parts, but outsourcing will have no direct effect. From (11) it is easy to see that for 0 = τ no effort will provided so that concerning our production function
, this means that output falls to zero. Therefore, we assume 1 0 < < τ . Since changes in low-skilled wage and profit income affect all skilled workers, each skilled worker will adjust its effort and thus the average effort will change. These effects we derive by taking the differential of effort function (11). Here, we find 0 > In our framework we assume Nash-behaviour, where every worker chooses his/her effort taking the effort of others as given. So there is no effect of effort provision by the other workers and thus no effect on the social norm. See also Lin et al. (2002) .
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The index i has been dropped for notational convenience.
conformity with empirics. 12 Since higher low-skilled wage reduces low-skilled employment due to the complementary relationship of the two types of labour, the high-skilled employment also decreases. However, decreasing high-skilled employment raises the effort provision of an employed skilled worker, since the influence of an individual worker on profit increases and he/she provides more effort. We can now summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 1: Profit income and low-skilled wage have an individual effort augmenting effect and thus increase productivity.
Important for the next analysis is the effort elasticity of low-skilled wage. In our framework we find 
Direct Employment Effects for Skilled Workers
Since we assume a constant skilled wage H w , the employment of high-skilled workers is described by equation (7). Thus, we can determine the direct employment effects of lowskilled wage and profit sharing by taking into account the effects of effort provision. The low-skilled wage affects the high-skilled labour demand in a direct way. Since higher low-skilled wage decreases the high-skilled labour demand, this shows the complementarity between both labour types. Moreover, there is an indirect opposite effect via effort because higher low-skilled wage raises effort and higher effort increases high-skilled labour demand. Formally, the influence of the low-skilled wage on the employment of the high-skilled workers can be presented as follows 
12 See e.g. Bhargava and Jenkinson (1995) , Booth and Frank (1999) , Cable and Wilson (1990) , Cahuc and Dormont (1997) , Hart and Hubler (1991) , Kruse (1992) , Lynn Hannan (2005) and Wadhwani and Wall (1990) .
so that there is a negative relationship between the low-skilled wage and the employment of the high-skilled workers and the direct complementary effect dominates the indirect effort effect. Profit sharing affects the high-skilled labour demand only via the provided effort. Since higher profit sharing enhances effort provision and higher effort increases high-skilled labour demand, there is a positive direct relationship between high-skilled employment and profit sharing. Differentiating (7) with respect to profit sharing τ and taking into account the effort effect gives
We can now summarize our findings regarding the properties of the skilled employment in the presence of outsourcing as follows. These results are intuitive in our setting. Higher low-skilled wage will affect the high-skilled labour demand via two channels. The first is the negative direct wage effect, which leads to a lower high-skilled demand because of the complementary relationship between low-skilled and high-skilled workers. However, this will increase the effort, which increases the highskilled labour demand. This describes the second channel, which is a positive indirect effect. In our analysis we show, that the direct effect dominates and thus higher low-skilled wage will reduce the high-skilled labour demand. The positive direct effect of profit sharing can be explained as follows. Higher profit sharing will increase the effort, which leads for given wage level to a higher productivity, which increases the labour demand.
Unskilled Wage Formation and Employment Effects
Now we analyse the wage formation of unskilled workers, which takes place in anticipation of optimal labour and outsourcing decisions by the firm. We analyse the wage formation by the monopoly labour union (see also Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) , p. 401-403 concerning the monopoly union specification), which determines the wage for unskilled workers in anticipation of optimal in-house unskilled labour demand, of flexible outsourcing and of highskilled employment.
13
Wage Formation by the Monopoly Labour Union
The objective function of the labour union of unskilled workers is assumed to be ( )
, where L b is the (exogenous) outside option available for unskilled workers and N is the number of labour union members. The monopoly labour union sets the wage for the unskilled workers so as to maximize the surplus according to
The first-order condition associated with (14) is
where the total unskilled wage elasticity of unskilled labour demand in this model is
. Simplifying the first-order condition (15) we get
where η can, by using our former results, be rewritten to
is the own wage elasticity of unskilled labour demand (equation (6a)),
is the effort elasticity of unskilled labour demand (equation (6b)) and 13 In Western European countries, which we like to focus on, labour market institutions are close to this (see e.g. Freeman, 2008) .
is the effort elasticity with respect to the low-skilled wage. These unskilled labour demand elasticities are not constant because the unskilled labour demand depends negatively on the skilled wage and the unskilled wage but positively on the skilled worker's effort and the costs of outsourcing c . However, in our framework the effort elasticity is constant. Because ( )
then the mark-up between outside option and unskilled wage is above one, i.e. 1 ) 1 /( > − η η . In order to answer our research question and characterize the effect of outsourcing costs on the unskilled wage formation, we therefore apply the implicit differentiation (for the details see Appendix B). Differentiating the wage formation (16) with respect to the unskilled wage and the outsourcing costs gives 0 1
and differentiating (16) with respect to the profit sharing and the unskilled wage gives 0 1
. For the effects on the total low-skilled labour demand elasticity we find (see Appendix B)
and
. Therefore, a higher low-skilled wage will increase the total wage elasticity of domestic unskilled labour demand and higher outsourcing costs and profit share will decrease the total wage elasticity of domestic unskilled labour demand.
14 Finally, we can conclude that 0 > dc
Knowing this, we are able to find an answer to our main question: How does the implementation of profit sharing for high-skilled workers influence outsourcing activities? Differentiating (4) in terms of profit sharing gives
so that the effect of outsourcing activities is driven by the effect on low-skilled wage, which is positive. We can summarize our findings concerning the effects of outsourcing costs and profit sharing on low-skilled wage, which also determines the effect of profit sharing on outsourcing.
Proposition 3:
In the presence of flexible outsourcing a) lower costs of outsourcing decreases the wage for unskilled labour and b) higher profit sharing for the skilled workers has a positive effect on the wage for unskilled labour, whereas c) higher profit sharing for the skilled workers has an enhancing effect on outsourcing.
Higher profit sharing increases the skilled labour demand and since the labour inputs are assumed to be complements, the low-skilled labour demand also raises. Thus, a higher lowskilled wage will have a smaller loss for the trade union via less dismissals and the union can set a higher wage. Since higher profit sharing increases the firm's profit, the labour union gets a higher share of this due to a higher low-skilled wage. But the wage enhancing effect will also induce a higher outsourcing demand, which can be explained by the substitutability of domestic low-skilled labour services and foreign intermediate goods.
The positive relationship between low-skilled wage and outsourcing costs can be described as follows. Lower outsourcing costs mean for a given low-skilled wage level a higher outsourcing demand and a more elastic low-skilled labour demand. Thus the opportunity for the labour union to set a higher wage falls. To avoid outsourcing and to make integrated production more attractive, the trade union reacts with a decreasing low-skilled wage.
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Knowing the low-skilled wage effect of profit sharing, we can also look at the relationship of the wage levels and thus on the impact of wage dispersion in a firm. Since it is reasonable to assume that L H w w > , where H w is constant from a single firm's view, we can conclude
Proposition 4:
Profit sharing for high-skilled workers decreases duo to a higher wage sets by the low-skilled trade union the wage dispersion in a firm.
Our analysis shows that introducing profit sharing increases the wage for low-skilled workers, since the union can act more aggressive due to the labour augmenting effort effect. Because
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This lies in conformity with empirics, see evidence from various countries, e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1999) , Hijzen et al. (2005) , Egger and Egger (2006) , Scheffel (2007a), Geishecker and Görg (2008) or Munch and Skaksen (2009). we assume a single firm and a given wage for high-skilled workers, thus profit sharing leads to a lower wage gap in that single firm.
Employment Effects
After knowing the wage effects, we can also determine the induced employment effects for low-skilled and high-skilled workers.
The effect of profit sharing on low-skilled employment by using equation (5), (11) and (18), can be characterized as
This result becomes clearer, if we simplify the second term. Here we rewrite the effect on low-skilled labour demand as
The first term in equation (20) describes the effort effect. We show that higher profit sharing induces higher effort, which leads to an increase in high-skilled labour employment. Since the labour inputs are complements the low-skilled labour demand also increases. Therefore we have a positive effect on low-skilled employment through a profit sharing scheme. However, the increase of low-skilled labour demand opens the opportunity for the trade union to set a higher wage. Due to this increase in low-skilled labour costs, the firm will engage more in outsourcing and demand less low-skilled labour. This negative effect is characterized by the second term in (20). Thus we have to oppose low-skilled labour effects of a profit sharing scheme for high-skilled workers, where the overall effect is ambiguous. From this we can conclude, that it is possible to observe more outsourcing and higher low-skilled employment if the low-skilled wage increases due to profit sharing. Similarly, we can also determine the overall high-skilled employment effect. Notice, that up to now we have in 3.2 only analysed the direct effect of profit sharing on the skilled labour demand. From equation (7) we can derive the overall effect of profit sharing on high-skilled employment. Using the equations (12) and (13) jointly with (18), the overall effect can be expressed as 16 From equation (21) we see that higher profit sharing has an ambiguous overall effect on skilled employment. The first term describes the known effort effect. As we have shown, profit sharing increases effort and thus productivity. This in turn increases the high-skilled labour demand. Thus, the first term describes an enhancing high-skilled employment effect. On the other hand there is a negative effect via the increasing effect on the low-skilled wage. This effect results, since with higher effort the opportunity of the low-skilled trade union to set a higher wage increases, which induces a decrease in the low-skilled labour demand and, due to the complementarity of the inputs, also a decrease on the high-skilled labour demand. Therefore, the high-skilled employment effect also consists of two opposed effects, where the overall effect is ambiguous.
Proposition 5:
In the presence of flexible outsourcing profit sharing affects a firm's demand for highskilled and low-skilled workers via two opposed effects. The first is the effort effect, which enhances the labour demand, whereas the low-skilled wage effect as the second working channel decreases the labour demand.
As our last results pointed out, it is possible that implementing a profit sharing scheme for high-skilled workers decreases the wage gap in a firm without losing low-skilled employment, if the labour increasing productivity effect offset the labour decreasing wage effect. Since bonus payments for high-skilled workers must not lead in any case to lower employment of low-skilled workers, such a compensation scheme is not as bad as it is seen in the public opinion.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have tried to describe a realistic framework of flexible outsourcing in a partly unionized dual labour market by using reasonable assumptions. In Western European countries we often observe that, unlike low-skilled workers, who are organized in trade unions, high-skilled wages are mostly determined competitively. However, high-skilled workers could also directly participate in the firm's success via profit sharing, which also affects the wage determination of low-skilled labour and also the outsourcing demand. Thereby, we answer the following questions: Firstly, how does the implementation of profit sharing for high-skilled workers influence outsourcing activities? Secondly, how does this influence the wage for low-skilled of workers and thus the labour demand for both types of labour?
In the above analyses we could show that the wage of the low-skilled workers will be positively affected by outsourcing costs and profit sharing for high-skilled workers. Since the high-skilled wage is constant and higher than the low-skilled wage, thus higher outsourcing costs and profit sharing reduce the wage dispersion in a single firm. Also, we could conclude that the effect of profit sharing on outsourcing activities is indirect negatively via the lowskilled wage. This follows since outsourcing demand is only affected by the relationship of the low-skilled wage and outsourcing costs. Finally, we characterized the employment effects of profit sharing. Here we find that profit sharing induces higher low-skilled and high-skilled labour demand via increased effort, but on the other hand decreases the labour demand for both types via the higher low-skilled wage. Thus the employment effects are ambiguous. In what follows, under certain circumstances, profit sharing or bonus payments for high-skilled worker helps to realize the aims of adequate wage and high employment level for low-skilled workers in a certain firm. Therefore, not in any case the restriction or the prohibition of such compensation schemes is advisable.
Since we see the high-skilled worker as a member of a group, in contrast to the above analysis, one can also assume that the group size is constant but the high-skilled wage will be flexible determined from equality of labour demand and a constant supply, which is equivalent to the group size. In this approach, thus there is no skilled employment effect but a skilled wage effect. Using this framework, comparative statics show that due to the assumptions there is a direct positive relationship between profit sharing and the high-skilled wage and low-skilled wage. After knowing the low-skilled wage effects one can determine the overall effects of outsourcing costs and profit sharing on the skilled wage. Due to the complementary relationship between the two types of labour, higher low-skilled wage reduces the high-skilled wage. Since there is a positive link between outsourcing costs and low-skilled wage, higher outsourcing costs results in a lower high-skilled wage. In contrast, the effect of profit sharing on high-skilled wage is ambiguous. On the one hand there is a wage increasing effect via higher effort whilst on the other hand there is the decreasing effect via the lowskilled wage, which will increase with higher profit sharing. Thus in the case of flexible highskilled wage, profit sharing can have a supplementary or compensatory character for skilled labour. These properties are going confirm with empirical evidence. 16 Finally we can summarize that our results concerning the wage effects for low skills and the amount of outsourcing do not depend on the assumption of modelling the wage process for high-skilled workers. 
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